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Summary 
A major task in the effort to craft a final health reform bill 
that can be passed in both Houses of Congress is to balance 
government costs against making health insurance affordable 
for low- and middle-income families. The levels of premium 
and cost-sharing subsidies greatly determine how affordable 
insurance coverage and access to medical care would be 
for families under reform. Affordability in turn would affect 
compliance with the individual mandate. Without broad 
compliance, it would be difficult to maintain the proposed 
insurance reforms that depend on broad risk pools.
Using the Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy 
Simulation Model (HIPSM), we estimate the household 
financial burdens under the America’s Healthy Future Act 
of 2009 (AHFA) proposed by the Senate Finance Committee 
(including revisions as of October 2, 2009) and under two 
modifications of the AHFA that use alternative subsidy 
schedules: those specified in the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) introduced by the Senate 
Leadership on November 18, 2009, and those specified 
in H.R. 3962, passed by the House of Representatives on 
November 8, 2009. To be specific, we only look at the 
effects of changing the premium and cost-sharing subsidies 
that were included in the Senate Finance Committee (SFC) 
bill, holding all other features of the SFC bill constant. 
We focus largely on those who would purchase health 
insurance coverage directly through a new health insurance 
exchange (the exchange). The vast majority of the subsidies 
would be spent on these enrollees.
For ease of comparison, these simulations were modeled 
as if the reforms were fully implemented in 2009, and 
estimates are for that single year. We find that the number of 
uninsured would drop from 49 million to about 19 million 
people under the SFC bill and that the uninsured would 
decrease by less than half a million more under subsidies of 
the Senate Leadership bill and by about another 2 million 
with the subsidies specified in the House bill. Government 
subsidy costs in 2009 under the SFC bill are estimated 
at approximately $24 billion. Corresponding costs using 
the subsidies of the Senate Leadership bill would be $27 
billion and costs using subsidies of the House Bill would be 
approximately $39 billion.
Among those with insurance under reform, people who 
would obtain nongroup coverage in the exchange would 
generally face the highest health care cost burdens, so 
we focus the affordability analysis on them even though 
they would be a relatively small share of the nonelderly 
population, about 7 percent. Those eligible for Medicaid 
or CHIP under reform would face little or no out-of-pocket 
health care costs after reform if they enroll in those 
programs. People getting coverage through employers 
would generally face lower financial burdens than those 
enrolling in nongroup coverage, even in the exchange, 
as employers that offer coverage typically contribute 
significantly to the cost of premiums for their employees. 
Family health care costs (premiums plus out-of-pocket 
spending net of subsidies) for those buying nongroup 
coverage through the exchange would vary considerably 
by income and across the reform options. This is because 
the federal financial assistance provided through subsidies 
decreases as income increases, and the different reform 
approaches modeled would provide different levels of 
subsidization at each income level. Under the SFC bill, the 
median low-income family (with an income of 133 to 199 
percent of the federal poverty level [FPL]) would spend 
7 percent of its income on health care, while the median 
family with somewhat higher income (200 to 299 percent 
of the FPL) would spend 11 percent of its income. Those at 
the 90th percentile of the spending distribution, families 
with greater health care needs and older adults, would 
face higher burdens due to additional out-of-pocket costs 
and the effects of 4:1 age rating bands. While premiums 
generally account for most of household health care costs, 
the burden of out-of-pocket cost-sharing for those with the 
highest expenses can reach above 10 percent of income 
under the SFC bill. 
Changes in
Health Care Financing 
& Organization
An initiative of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 
managed by AcademyHealth
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Introduction 
With the approval of America’s Healthy 
Future Act of 2009 (AHFA) by the Senate 
Finance Committee, the introduction 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (PPACA) by the Senate 
Leadership, and the passage of the 
Affordable Health Care for America Act 
(H.R. 3962) in the House, final decisions 
on the key provisions of health reform 
legislation are under way.1 A major 
task in the effort to craft a final health 
reform bill that can be passed by both 
Houses of Congress is to balance the 
budgetary cost to government against 
making health insurance affordable 
for low- and middle-income families. 
Coverage expansions under the AHFA 
proposal would be less costly to the 
federal government than under PPACA 
or H.R. 3962. In part, this is because 
AHFA has generally lower subsidies to 
assist families with purchasing health 
insurance coverage in the new health 
insurance exchange, as well as lower 
cost-sharing subsidies that reduce what 
those families would pay out-of-pocket 
when they use medical care. The levels 
of premium and cost-sharing subsidies 
remain key issues of debate and greatly 
determine how affordable insurance 
coverage will be for families under 
reform.
In this brief, we estimate the tradeoffs 
between government costs and 
household affordability for families of 
different income levels.2 We examine 
the effects of AHFA as the base case, 
and then show what would happen 
under two variations. The first variation 
replaces the premium subsidies of 
AHFA with those specified in PPACA 
introduced in the Senate on November 
18, 2009. The second variation expands 
both premium and cost-sharing subsidies 
to those specified under H.R. 3962.3 
Age rating rules, Medicaid eligibility, 
eligibility rules for purchasing exchange 
coverage, and other components of 
reform are held constant and set to be 
consistent with the AHFA. In each policy 
simulation, we estimate the effects of 
the policies on coverage, costs, and 
family financial burdens for health care 
(premium and out-of-pocket spending 
relative to income). 
We focus the affordability analysis on 
people taking nongroup coverage in the 
proposed health insurance exchange, a 
new structured market for the purchase 
of health insurance. Even though this 
group would constitute a relatively 
small share of the population—about 7 
percent of the nonelderly population—
they would face the highest health 
care cost burdens among those with 
insurance under reform. Those eligible 
for Medicaid or CHIP under reform 
would face little or no out-of-pocket 
health care costs after reform if they 
enroll. People getting coverage through 
employers would generally face lower 
financial burdens than those taking 
nongroup coverage because employers 
typically pay the majority of premium 
costs. We conclude the analysis by 
presenting simulated health care 
burdens in the nongroup exchange 
under a variation (of our own design) 
that adds targeted subsidies to those 
specified in H.R. 3962 to decrease the 
highest health care cost burdens in the 
exchange with a relatively small increase 
in government costs. 
Methods
To estimate the effects of the reform 
options, we use the Urban Institute’s 
Health Insurance Policy Simulation 
Compared to SFC bill subsidies, premium subsidies under 
the Senate Leadership bill are lower for low-income 
families and higher for eligible higher-income families. At 
both the median and the 90th percentile of spending, the 
Senate Leadership bill subsidies would decrease family 
health care cost burdens by about 1 percent of income for 
those between 200 to 399 percent of the FPL compared 
with the SFC bill. Substituting the premium and out-of-
pocket subsidy schedules from the House bill, which are 
both larger than those of the SFC bill, would do more for 
lower-income families—decreasing median family health 
care cost burdens by about 2 percent of income for those 
between 133 and 299 percent of the FPL. Under the House 
bill subsidies, much larger reductions in financing burden 
would occur among higher spenders due to the additional 
cost-sharing subsidies that would be provided. A further 
targeted increase in cost-sharing subsidies beyond those in 
the House bill can significantly decrease the burdens faced 
by the highest health care spenders below 400 percent of 
the FPL while expanding coverage, at an additional cost of 
about $4 billion to the government. 
Each option presented here would greatly reduce the 
number of uninsured and make health insurance more 
affordable for millions of Americans. This analysis shows 
that health care cost burdens under the Senate Finance 
Committee bill can be substantial for those with incomes 
from 200 to 499 percent of the FPL, particularly for those 
with significant health care needs. Expansions of premium 
and cost-sharing subsidies could be designed such that 
the largest burdens are substantially reduced for these 
groups, and doing so would increase overall coverage as 
well as government costs. Public support for the reforms 
will be related to the extent to which coverage and the 
direct costs of care are considered affordable, making it 
critical to balance such concerns with the government costs 
associated with comprehensive health care reform.
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Model (HIPSM).4 HIPSM simulates the 
decisions of businesses and individuals 
in response to policy changes, such 
as Medicaid expansions, new health 
insurance options, subsidies for 
the purchase of health insurance, 
and insurance market reforms. The 
model provides estimates of changes 
in government and private costs, 
premiums, rates of employer offers of 
coverage, and health insurance coverage 
resulting from specified reforms.5
We first model the comprehensive 
reforms specified in the AHFA, including 
revisions as of October 2, 2009. The 
model captures the basic elements of the 
AHFA related to the coverage choices 
of nonelderly Americans, with some 
simplifications. These elements include 
the following:
•   Medicaid expansion to 133 percent of 
the federal poverty level (FPL) for all 
adults, with CHIP remaining in place 
for children at current levels. 
•   An individual mandate with a 
penalty for remaining uninsured, 
with exemption from the penalty 
if a family’s out-of-pocket premium 
exceeds 8 percent of income. 
•   A new health insurance exchange 
(“the exchange”) offering plans 
constructed to meet actuarial value 
standards of 70, 80, and 90 percent. 
Higher actuarial values reflect more 
comprehensive insurance coverage 
for a given set of covered services 
(see box above).6 The base plan 
offered through the exchange is the 
“silver” benefit package which has 
an actuarial value of 70 percent. 
Exchange plans are guaranteed issue, 
and premiums are age rated with 
4:1 age bands, meaning the oldest 
purchasers can be charged premiums 
up to four times as high as the 
youngest adult purchasers.7 Exchange 
based insurance coverage is available 
to individuals and families purchasing 
nongroup coverage independent of 
an employer and to employer groups 
with 100 or fewer employees. 
•   Refundable premium tax credits 
(“premium subsidies”) available to 
eligible families purchasing insurance 
through the exchange. The premium 
subsidies are provided on a sliding 
scale basis. These subsidies limit the 
maximum percentage of income 
that a family would have to spend 
on its health insurance premium 
to 2 percent of income for those at 
100 percent of the FPL, phasing up 
to 12 percent of income for those 
with incomes between 300 and 400 
percent of the FPL (see first column 
of Table 1).8 
•   Employees of large firms that offer 
coverage would be ineligible for 
subsidized coverage in the exchange 
unless the employee’s share of the 
employer coverage premium exceeds 
10 percent of income.
•   Cost-sharing subsidies available to 
eligible families purchasing insurance 
through the exchange. Cost-sharing 
subsidies would decrease household 
out-of-pocket medical costs by 
effectively increasing the actuarial 
value of a plan from 70 percent in the 
base exchange plans to 90 percent 
for those with incomes between 100 
percent and 133 percent of the FPL 
and to 80 percent for those with 
incomes up to 200 percent of the FPL 
(see first column of Table 2). 
•   A small group tax credit for firms 
with 25 or fewer employees that offer 
health insurance. The tax credit covers 
up to 50 percent of the employer’s 
share of the premium for the lowest 
wage employees in the smallest 
firms, and phases out for higher-wage 
employees and larger firms. 
•   Assessments (“free-rider penalties”) 
on firms with 50 or more employees 
that do not offer health insurance, 
for employees receiving premium 
subsidies through the exchange.9 
   Actuarial Value
Actuarial value reflects the share of average covered benefits paid by the insurer, where the remaining amount is the 
responsibility of the enrollee. Using a nationally representative nonelderly population, examples of single coverage plans 
with different actuarial values are as follows:
70 percent actuarial value
 • $1,500 deductible, 15% coinsurance, $5,000 out-of-pocket limit
 • $1,250 deductible, 20% coinsurance, $5,000 out-of-pocket limit
85 percent actuarial value
 • $250 deductible, 15% coinsurance, $2,200 out-of-pocket limit
 • $275 deductible, 10% coinsurance, $5,000 out-of-pocket limit.
For more information and examples, see Karen Pollitz, “Using Actuarial Value to Define Cost Sharing Subsidies,” Report 
submitted to the American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network, September 2009.
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•   Auto-enrollment of large firm 
employees into employer coverage.10
In modeling the AHFA, for the purpose 
of computing exchange premiums, 
we assume that those enrolling in 
nongroup exchange coverage are 
pooled with those enrolling in the 
employer-sponsored coverage through 
the exchange. We expect many states 
will operate their exchange in this 
way, although under the AFHA states 
could choose to operate the small 
employer and nongroup exchanges 
independently. We also assume that 
under full implementation of reform, 
state Medicaid and CHIP eligibility is 
maintained.11
We do not model the policy shift in 
AHFA where, after the initial year, the 
AHFA’s premium subsidies change to a 
schedule that defines the percentage of 
the premium that a family is required 
to pay, rather than a schedule that 
defines a percentage of income that 
a family is required to pay.12 To the 
extent that health insurance premiums 
grow faster than income, a family 
receiving premium subsidies in the 
exchange would pay an increasing 
percent of income over time.13 These 
simplifications, we believe, are not 
likely to substantially affect our overall 
findings.
Analysis of Reform
We simulate the effects of two variations 
on AHFA. The first variation uses the 
basic reform elements of AHFA but 
applies the premium subsidy schedules 
for the health insurance exchange 
that are specified in PPACA. The cost-
sharing subsidy schedule specified in 
PPACA is unchanged from AHFA. These 
premium and cost-sharing schedules 
are shown in the second columns of 
Tables 1 and 2, respectively. The second 
variation uses the basic reform elements 
of AHFA but applies the premium and 
cost-sharing subsidy schedules for the 
health insurance exchange that are 
specified in H.R. 3962, as shown in 
the third columns of Tables 1 and 2, 
respectively. Out-of-pocket spending 
limits specified in PPACA and H.R. 
3962 are also applied in each variation, 
respectively.14 Finally, we show the 
results of a targeted increase in cost-
sharing subsidies that addresses the high 
health care cost burdens for those with 
incomes between 200 and 399 percent 
of the FPL.
As shown in Table 1, the maximum 
percentage of income that a family 
would have to spend on premiums is 
higher under AHFA than under the 
H.R. 3962 schedule at every applicable 
income level. Lower-income families 
face a slightly higher premium cap 
under PPACA compared to under AHFA, 
while higher-income families have a 
lower cap under PPACA than under 
AHFA. For those with incomes of 133 
percent of the FPL, a family would have 
its premium contribution capped at 3.7 
percent of income under AHFA and at 
4.0 percent under PPACA, more than 
twice as high as under H.R. 3962 with 
a 1.5 percent of income cap. For those 
between 300 and 400 percent of the 
FPL, the AHFA would cap premiums 
at 12 percent while the PPACA would 
cap premiums at 9.8 percent. H.R. 3962 
would use a cap beginning at 10 percent 
of income at 300 percent of the FPL 
and increasing linearly to 12 percent at 
400 percent of the FPL. The differences 
between AHFA and H.R. 3962 are 
particularly large in relative terms for 
the lowest income groups.
The alternative cost-sharing subsidy 
schedules are shown in Table 2. Under 
both AHFA and the PPACA, families 
with incomes between 100 and 150 
percent of the FPL who buy coverage 
in the exchange would be subsidized 
for the purchase of an insurance plan 
with an actuarial value of 90 percent. 
Premium Subsidies  
from America’s Healthy 
Future Act (AHFA)a
Premium Subsidies  
from the Patient  
Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (PPACA)b
Premium Subsidies  
from H.R. 3962c
Income as a % of the FPL
100% FPL 2.0% 2.0% n.a.
133% FPL 3.7% 4.0% 1.5%
150% FPL 4.5% 4.6% 3.0%
200% FPL 7.0% 6.3% 5.5%
250% FPL 9.5% 8.1% 8.0%
300% FPL 12.0% 9.8% 10.0%
350% FPL 12.0% 9.8% 11.0%
400% FPL 12.0% 9.8% 12.0%
n.a. = not applicable, only eligible for Medicaid
 
Note: Under AHFA, this percentage is constant between 300% and 400% of FPL. Otherwise, the maximum percentage of pre-
mium paid increases linearly as income increases under both AHFA and H.R. 3962. “Family” refers to health insurance units, that is, 
family members who buy insurance coverage as a  group, including single individuals.   
 
a Source: Baucus, Max. America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009, Chairman’s Mark, Senate Finance Committee. Modified October 2, 
2009. Http://www.finance.senate.gov/sitepages/leg/LEG%202009/100209_Americas_Healthy_Future_Act_AMENDED.pdf.
 
b Source: These are approximate values. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (H.R. 3590) introduced November 18, 
2009. Http://democrats.senate.gov/reform/patient-protection-affordable-care-act.pdf. 
 
c Source: Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R. 3962) introduced October 29, 2009. Http://docs.house.gov/rules/
health/111_ahcaa.pdf.
Table 1.  Maximum Percentage of Income a Family Would Pay for Premiums 
in the Exchange for a Base Plan, by Income as a Percent of the FPL
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The federal government would pay the 
difference between the cost of a plan 
with a 90 percent actuarial value and 
the base plan which would have an 
actuarial value of 70 percent. Families 
with incomes between 150 and 200 
percent of the FPL would be subsidized 
for the purchase of an insurance plan 
with an actuarial value of 80 percent. 
No cost-sharing subsidies would be 
provided to families with incomes 
exceeding 200 percent of the FPL. 
Cost-sharing subsidies in H.R. 3962 
would raise actuarial values to higher 
levels than under AHFA or the PPACA 
for every applicable income group 
below 350 percent of the FPL. The 
fourth column of Table 2 shows an 
enhanced cost-sharing schedule that 
could be used to target high health care 
burdens for those between 200 and 400 
percent of the FPL; results for this final 
schedule are presented at the end of 
the analysis.
Results 
Health insurance coverage. Table 
3 shows the distribution of health 
insurance coverage for the nonelderly 
population prior to reform (the baseline) 
and the distribution of health insurance 
coverage under each of the simulated 
reforms. The number of uninsured 
would fall from 49.1 million to 19.3 
million people under AHFA. Medicaid/
CHIP coverage would increase by 17.6 
million people. An estimated 13.6 
million people would obtain coverage in 
the employer exchange, and 17.4 million 
people would obtain coverage in the 
nongroup exchange. 
Under the PPACA subsidies, the number 
of uninsured would decrease to 18.9 
million and the number of enrollees 
in the nongroup exchange would 
be 18.1 million, an increase of 0.7 
million compared to AHFA (Table 3). 
The higher premium and cost-sharing 
subsidies in H.R. 3962 compared with 
AHFA result in 17.3 million uninsured 
under H.R. 3962. The number of people 
obtaining nongroup coverage through 
the exchange would increase to 20.3 
million with the H.R. 3962 subsidies in 
place. Higher subsidies make coverage 
more affordable, leading more subsidy-
eligible people to prefer to buy coverage 
within the exchange rather than keep 
their current coverage or pay a penalty 
for being uninsured. Also, by increasing 
the premium subsidies, fewer people 
are exempted from the requirement to 
purchase coverage, since fewer face 
out-of-pocket premiums exceeding 8 
percent of income. 
Compared to the reduction in uninsured 
under AHFA, the number of uninsured 
is reduced by less than half a million 
people under the subsidies specified 
in PPACA and by nearly an additional 
2 million people under H.R. 3962 
subsidies. The additional reduction in 
the number of uninsured resulting from 
expanded subsidies is modest because 
we assume that many people would 
comply with the individual mandate 
even under AHFA, which limits the 
amount of additional impact on coverage 
Actuarial Values from 
America’s Healthy Future Act 
(AHFA)
Actuarial Values from the 
Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA)
Actuarial Values from H.R. 
3962
Actuarial Values for 
“Enhanced” Cost-Sharing 
Subsidies
Base Plan* 70% 70% 70% 70%
Income as a % of the FPL
100% through 133% FPL 90% 90% n.a. n.a.
133% through 150% FPL 90% 90% 97% 97%
150% through 200% FPL 80% 80% 93% 93%
200% through 250% FPL 70%* 70%* 85% 85%
250% through 300% FPL 70%* 70%* 78% 85%
300% through 350% FPL 70%* 70%* 72% 85%
350% through 400% FPL 70%* 70%* 70%* 70%*
n.a. = not applicable, only eligible for Medicaid
 
Note: Cost-sharing subsidies would reduce individual and family cost-sharing such that the average actuarial value (percentage of covered benefits paid by the plan or the government) is equal to the 
percentage shown. The federal government would provide subsidies to pay for the difference between the actuarial value of 70% in the base exchange plans and the increased actuarial values shown in 
the table. For those enrolled in a base exchange plan and eligible for subsidies, the plan and the government would together cover the percentage shown of medical costs of a typical population enrolled 
in that plan. Enrollees would pay the remainder in out-of-pocket cost-sharing.  
 
*  Under each option, no plan offered in the exchange would have an actuarial value of less than the base plan. Those eligible for exchange enrollment, but not eligible for cost-sharing subsidies, can 
enroll in the base plan. Under AHFA, for example, those over 200% FPL who are eligible for enrollment in the exchange are not eligible for cost-sharing subsidies; they have the option of enrolling in the 
base plan with an actuarial value of 70%.
Table 2.  Alternative Actuarial Values for the Base Plan in the Exchange for Those Eligible for Subsidies, by Income 
as a Percent of the FPL 
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that can be obtained from higher 
subsidies. Furthermore, the main effect 
of the higher subsidies is only on the 
subset of people who remain uninsured 
under the provisions of the AHFA, do 
not have offers of employer coverage, 
and are not eligible for Medicaid/CHIP. 
Of this subset of people, the effects of 
the additional subsidies are relatively 
large. 
Aggregate Government, Employer, 
and Household Spending. Table 4 
shows the costs to the government of 
the different components of reform 
as well as the costs associated with 
uncompensated care, the costs to 
employers, and household costs. 
Medicaid/CHIP spending would 
remain relatively constant across the 
three policy options. Total net new 
costs to the government (federal and 
state) of AHFA would be $78.0 billion 
if the reform were fully implemented 
in 2009. Government spending for 
premium subsidies for families would be 
$21.7 billion, while spending for cost-
sharing subsidies would be $1.8 billion. 
Other net government costs (the cost 
of subsidies to small employers, less 
revenue from penalties paid by families 
who remain uninsured and less revenue 
from “free-rider penalties” paid by 
employers) would be $3.6 billion.
The amount spent on uncompensated 
care would fall by $32.3 billion (52.9 
percent) under AHFA from $61.1 billion 
under current law, due to the large 
reduction in the number of uninsured 
under the AHFA. On net, employer 
spending for health care is held relatively 
constant under AHFA, decreasing by 1.5 
percent. Increased employer spending 
due to more post-reform employer 
coverage (including employer-sponsored 
coverage within the exchange) is offset 
on net by employer premium subsidies. 
Spending by individuals and families for 
premiums and out-of-pocket health care 
costs would increase on net by $21.0 
billion, or 6.7 percent.15 
Compared to AHFA, the premium 
subsidy schedule of PPACA would 
increase government premium 
subsidies by an additional $3.3 billion, 
Baseline America’s Healthy  Future Act (AHFA) 
AHFA with Premium  
Subsidies and Cost-Sharing 
Subsidies from PPACA
AHFA with Premium  
Subsidies and Cost-Sharing 
Subsidies from H.R. 3962
Coverage (in Millions)
Employer (Excluding Exchange) 151.0 56.5% 138.8 52.0% 138.8 52.0% 135.4 50.7%
Nongroup (Excluding Exchange) 15.7 5.9% 9.1 3.4% 8.8 3.3% 8.7 3.2%
Exchange Employer 0.0 0.0% 13.6 5.1% 13.4 5.0% 15.9 6.0%
Exchange Nongroup 0.0 0.0% 17.4 6.5% 18.1 6.8% 20.3 7.6%
Medicaid/CHIP 42.9 16.1% 60.6 22.7% 60.6 22.7% 61.0 22.9%
Other (Including Medicare) 8.4 3.2% 8.4 3.2% 8.4 3.2% 8.4 3.2%
Uninsured 49.1 18.4% 19.3 7.2% 18.9 7.1% 17.3 6.5%
Change in Coverage
Employer (Excluding Exchange) — — -12.2 -4.6%* -12.2 -4.6% -15.6 -5.8%
Nongroup (Excluding Exchange) — — -6.6 -2.5% -6.9 -2.6% -7.0 -2.6%
Exchange Employer — — 13.6 5.1% 13.4 5.0% 15.9 6.0%
Exchange Nongroup — — 17.4 6.5% 18.1 6.8% 20.3 7.6%
Medicaid/CHIP — — 17.6 6.6% 17.7 6.6% 18.1 6.8%
Other (Including Medicare) — — 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0%
Uninsured — — -29.8 -11.2% -30.2 -11.3% -31.8 -11.9%
Decline in uninsured — 60.8% 61.4% 64.7%
Covered or eligible for public coverage 86.0% 95.4% 95.6% 96.1%
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2009.
Note: Reforms are modeled as if they were fully implemented in 2009, and estimates are for that single year.
* Percentage point difference in coverage rate compared to baseline.
Table 3.  Health Insurance Coverage Distribution of Non-elderly in Baseline and Reform Under AHFA and 
Alternative Reforms 
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with decreases in costs for employers, 
individuals, and families. H.R. 3962 
premium and cost-sharing subsidy 
schedules would increase government 
premium subsidies by $10.2 billion 
and government cost-sharing subsidies 
by $5.2 billion relative to AHFA. The 
additional subsidies of H.R. 3962 would 
result in a net decrease in individual 
and family health care spending by $4.3 
billion relative to the AHFA.16 
Family health care spending, by 
income group. Table 5 shows the 
distribution of family health care costs, 
including both direct spending on 
premiums and out-of-pocket spending 
on medical care, for the nonelderly 
population that would obtain nongroup 
coverage in the exchange post-reform. 
These estimates are net of any subsidies 
for which the families would be eligible. 
In the results, “families” refers to health 
insurance units, that is, family members 
who can buy insurance coverage as a 
group, including single individuals.17 
We focus on those who would enroll 
in coverage through the nongroup 
exchange because, lacking employer 
premium contributions, they would 
typically face the highest out-of-pocket 
health care costs before subsidies, and 
are thus the group for whom subsidies 
matter the most.18 Those obtaining 
coverage outside the exchange are not 
eligible for government-funded premium 
or out-of-pocket subsidies, so including 
them in the distributional tables would 
tend to obscure the differences across 
the subsidy schedules. The table reports 
the median and 90th percentile of 
spending, by income group. Those 
whose health spending is far above the 
median face higher premiums (being 
in the higher age-rating categories or 
having a large family), need high levels 
of medical care, or both. 
Senate Finance 
Committee’s America’s 
Healthy Future Act 
(AHFA) of 2009
AHFA with Premium 
Subsidies and  
Cost-Sharing  
Subsidies from PPACA
Difference relative   
to AHFA
AHFA with Premium 
Subsidies and Cost-
Sharing Subsidies  
from H.R. 3962
Difference relative  
to AHFA
Total Government Spending (Federal + State)
Baseline $246.8 $246.8 — $246.8 —
Net Change Post Reform $78.0 $81.7 $3.7 $95.0 $17.0
Medicaid/CHIP $50.9 $51.2 $0.3 $52.2 $1.3
Premium Subsidies $21.7 $25.0 $3.3 $31.9 $10.2
Cost-sharing Subsidies $1.8 $1.8 $0.0 $7.0 $5.2
Other Net Government Costs* $3.6 $3.7 $0.0 $3.9 $0.3
% Change Post Reform 31.6% 33.1% 1.5% 38.5% 6.9%
Uncompensated Care
Baseline $61.1 $61.1 — $61.1 —
Net Change Post Reform -$32.3 -$32.4 $0.0 -$33.7 -$1.4
% Change Post Reform -52.9% -52.9% 0.0% -55.2% -2.3%
Employer Spending
Baseline $412.6 $412.6 — $412.6 —
Net Change Post Reform -$6.2 -$6.6 -$0.4 -$9.9 -$3.7
% Change Post Reform -1.5% -1.6% -0.1% -2.4% -0.9%
Individual and Family Spending
Baseline $315.0 $315.0 — $315.0 —
Net Change Post Reform $21.0 $19.2 -$1.8 $16.7 -$4.3
% Change Post Reform 6.7% 6.1% -0.6% 5.3% -1.4%
Aggregate Change $60.5 $61.9 $1.5 $68.1 $7.7
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2009.
Note: Reforms are modeled as if they were fully implemented in 2009, and estimates are for that single year.
* Other net government costs include subsidies to employers, less revenues from individual mandate penalties and free-rider penalties.
Table 4.  Health Care Spending of Government, Employers, Families and Uncompensated Care in Baseline and 
Reform Under AHFA and Alternative Reforms (in billions) 
Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues 8
Under AHFA, median family health care 
costs for the 133 to 199 percent of the 
FPL income group would be $1,381. For 
both the median and the 90th percentile, 
costs for these families are slightly lower 
under PPACA compared with AHFA. 
The reason is that the slightly lower 
premium subsidies specified in PPACA 
relative to AHFA for this group are 
offset by small decreases in the average 
medical expenditures of enrollees in the 
exchange—resulting, on net, in slightly 
lower costs under PPACA. In contrast, 
the premium and cost-sharing subsidies 
under H.R. 3962 would reduce median 
costs substantially for these lower-
income families to $891, a decrease of 
more than a third compared with AHFA. 
Similarly, costs at the 90th percentile 
would fall from $3,446 under AHFA to 
$2,044, a decrease of over 40 percent. 
For those with incomes from 200 to 299 
percent of the FPL, under AHFA, median 
household health care spending would 
be $3,324 and spending at the 90th 
percentile would be $7,417. Under the 
larger premium subsidies of PPACA for 
these families, spending at the median 
and 90th percentile would decrease by 
9.6 and 6.9 percent, respectively. With 
the H.R. 3962 premium and cost-sharing 
subsidies, median spending would fall 
to $2,663, a decrease of 20 percent. A 
similar percentage decrease relative to 
AHFA is observable at the 90th percentile 
and would decrease spending at this level 
to $6,048 under H.R. 3962 subsidies.
Increasing the premium and/or cost-
sharing subsidy schedules would have 
modest effects on median costs for 
those with income between 300 and 
399 percent of the FPL. Costs at the 
median show only a slight increase 
under H.R. 3962 due to changes in the 
composition of people buying coverage 
in the exchange. Relative to AHFA, costs 
at the 90th percentile would fall by 
9.5 percent under the larger premium 
subsides of PPACA and 8.8 percent with 
the premium and cost-sharing subsidies 
in H.R. 3962. Due to small changes 
in the composition of people within 
the exchange, there are very small 
differences in health care spending 
across the policy options for the two 
highest income groups even though 
they are not directly affected by the 
premiums subsidies.
Family financial burdens. Tables 
6 and 7 show the financial burdens 
of health care costs for those in the 
nongroup exchange. We measure 
financial burdens as the share of income 
that families spend, net of subsidies, 
on health insurance premiums, out-of-
pocket cost sharing, and total health 
care costs. 
America’s Healthy 
Future Act (AHFA) 
AHFA with Premium 
Subsidies and  
Cost-Sharing  
Subsidies from PPACA
Difference relative   
to AHFA
AHFA with Premium 
Subsidies and Cost-
Sharing Subsidies  
from H.R. 3962
Difference relative  
to AHFA
Income as a % of the FPL
133–199% FPL
Median $1,381 $1,338 -3.1% $891 -35.5%
90th percentile $3,446 $3,299 -4.3% $2,044 -40.7%
200–299% FPL
Median $3,324 $3,004 -9.6% $2,663 -19.9%
90th percentile $7,417 $6,903 -6.9% $6,048 -18.5%
300–399% FPL
Median $4,454 $4,441 -0.3% $4,536 1.8%
90th percentile $10,726 $9,705 -9.5% $9,778 -8.8%
400–499% FPL
Median $5,387 $5,398 0.2% $5,326 -1.1%
90th percentile $11,585 $11,588 0.0% $11,527 -0.5%
500% FPL or more
Median $7,182 $7,147 -0.5% $7,179 0.0%
90th percentile $16,465 $16,225 -1.5% $16,303 -1.0%
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2009.
Note: Total family health care costs include premiums plus out-of-pocket health care spending, less subsidies. “Family” refers to health insurance units, that is, family members who buy insurance cover-
age as a group, including single individuals. Reforms are modeled as if they were fully implemented in 2009, and estimates are for that single year.
Table 5.  Total Family Health Care Costs by Income as a Percent of the FPL for Enrollees in the Nongroup 
Exchange
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Median financial burdens, by income 
group. Table 6 shows median burdens 
by income group and Table 7 shows 90th 
percentile burdens by income group. 
The first panel of each table shows 
the financial burdens of premiums, 
the second panel shows the financial 
burdens of cost sharing, and the third 
panel shows the total financial burden of 
the two cost components combined.
For the lowest income group (133 to 
199 percent of the FPL) enrolled in 
the nongroup exchange, the median 
premium burden under the AHFA 
would be 5.4 percent of income. While 
this burden is similar under PPACA 
subsidies (the slight reduction is due 
to changes in the composition of 
people in the exchange), the H.R. 3962 
subsidies would reduce the burden 
for these families to 3.9 percent. The 
median premium burden for families 
with incomes from 200 to 299 percent 
of the FPL would be 8.7 percent under 
AHFA, and would be reduced to 7.8 
percent with the larger premium 
subsidies in PPACA and 7.7 percent 
with the subsidies in H.R. 3962. Median 
financial burdens of premiums are 
highest for those with incomes from 
300 to 399 percent of the FPL at 9.5 
percent of income under AHFA.19 For 
this income group, the median premium 
burden would not be reduced under the 
premium caps of AHFA, PPACA, or H.R. 
3962, since the unsubsidized median 
premium burden is already lower than 
the caps specified in those proposals. 
In fact, relative to the AHFA, burdens 
would increase slightly to 9.7 percent of 
income with the larger PPACA premium 
subsidies and 9.9 percent with H.R. 
3962 subsidies because of changes in 
the composition of people buying in 
the exchange. The premium burden for 
those with incomes between 300 and 
399 percent of the FPL would be higher 
than that of the two higher-income 
groups because larger incomes reduce 
the relative financial burden for the 
higher-income groups. 
Cost-sharing burdens would generally 
be lower than the financial burdens 
of premiums. Because health care 
spending is highly skewed across the 
population in any given year, median 
health care spending is relatively 
low.20 For this reason, median financial 
burdens of cost-sharing would be 
modest and range from 1.4 to 1.9 
percent across income groups under 
AHFA. PPACA does not reduce cost-
sharing burdens relative to AHFA. 
Being low to start with, median 
burdens only fall a small amount with 
the larger cost-sharing subsidies under 
H.R. 3962. 
Combining both premiums and cost 
sharing by families in the nongroup 
exchange, median financial burden 
under AHFA would be 6.9 percent of 
income for the lowest income group. 
While this burden would be largely 
unchanged under PPACA, it would fall to 
4.8 percent with the H.R. 3962 subsidy 
schedules. Median burdens would fall 
considerably with greater subsidies for 
the 200 to 299 percent of the FPL group, 
from 11.1 percent of income under 
AHFA to 9.9 percent under PPACA, and 
America’s Healthy Future 
Act (AHFA)
AHFA with Premium 
Subsidies and  
Cost-Sharing Subsidies 
from PPACA
AHFA with Premium 
Subsidies and Cost-
Sharing Subsidies from 
H.R. 3962
Nongroup Exchange 
Coverage (in Millions)
17.4 18.1 20.3
Out-of-pocket Health Insurance Premiums as a Share of Income
Median
133–199% FPL 5.4% 5.2% 3.9%
200–299% FPL 8.7% 7.8% 7.7%
300–399% FPL 9.5% 9.7% 9.9%
400–499% FPL 7.8% 7.8% 8.2%
500% FPL or more 5.7% 5.6% 5.8%
Out-of-pocket Cost-sharing for Health Care as a Share of Income
Median
133–199% FPL 1.4% 1.4% 0.6%
200–299% FPL 1.9% 1.9% 1.3%
300–399% FPL 1.8% 1.9% 1.8%
400–499% FPL 1.6% 1.6% 1.6%
500% FPL or more 1.4% 1.3% 1.4%
Total Health Care Costs as a Share of Income
Median
133–199% FPL 6.9% 6.7% 4.8%
200–299% FPL 11.1% 9.9% 9.1%
300–399% FPL 12.0% 11.1% 11.6%
400–499% FPL 9.8% 9.8% 10.2%
500% FPL or more 7.6% 7.3% 7.7%
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2009.
Notes: Total family health care costs include premiums plus out-of-pocket health care spending, less subsidies. “Family” refers to 
health insurance units, that is, family members who buy insurance coverage as a group, including single individuals. Reforms are 
modeled as if they were fully implemented in 2009, and estimates are for that single year.
Table 6.  Median Financial Burdens of Family Health Care Costs for Enrollees 
in the Nongroup Exchange, by Income as a Percent of the FPL 
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to 9.1 percent under H.R. 3962. Median 
burdens for the 300 to 399 percent of 
the FPL group would be reduced from 
12 percent under AHFA to 11.1 percent 
under PPACA, and to 11.6 percent under 
H.R. 3962. 
90th percentile financial burdens, by 
income group. Some families have health 
care burdens far above the median due 
to higher premiums, higher out-of-pocket 
spending on medical care, or both. At the 
90th percentile, the financial burdens of 
premiums under AHFA are 6.9 percent of 
income for those with incomes between 
133 and 199 percent of the FPL, 11.2 
percent for those with incomes between 
200 and 299 percent of the FPL, and 12 
percent for those with incomes between 
300 and 399 percent of the FPL. Under 
both PPACA and H.R. 3962 subsidies, 
premium burdens at the 90th percentile 
would decrease for all subsidized income 
groups relative to the AHFA. Ninetieth 
percentile burdens would be highest 
(13.4 percent) for those with incomes 
between 400 and 499 percent of the FPL, 
who are outside of the subsidy range. 
The financial burdens of cost-sharing at 
the 90th percentile are substantial. For 
the lowest income group, cost-sharing 
burdens at the 90th percentile would 
be 6.8 percent of income under AHFA, 
declining to 2.5 percent with the larger 
subsidies of H.R. 3962. As at the median, 
PPACA does not reduce cost-sharing 
burdens at the 90th percentile relative 
to AHFA. Under AHFA, 10 percent 
of families in the 200 to 299 percent 
of the FPL income range would face 
cost-sharing burdens of 9.8 percent of 
income or more. That burden would 
be reduced to 5.6 percent with H.R. 
3962 subsidies. Thus, these higher cost-
sharing subsidies of H.R. 3962 would 
substantially reduce financial burdens 
for lower-income families with high 
health care costs. 
Ten percent of families with incomes 
between 200 and 499 percent of the FPL 
would face health care cost burdens of 
at least 18.8 percent of income under 
AHFA. Burdens this high arise for 
individuals who are older or in poorer 
health or both, and for families with 
such members. Comparing PPACA to 
AHFA, 90th percentile burdens would 
drop about 1 percentage point for those 
with incomes between 200 and 399 
percent of the FPL. 
Under H.R. 3962, 90th percentile 
burdens are significantly lower than 
under the Senate proposals for those 
with incomes less than 300 percent of 
the FPL. For the lowest income group 
(133 to 199 percent of the FPL) the 90th 
percentile would spend 14.0 percent of 
income under AHFA but only 7.6 percent 
with H.R. 3962 subsidies. For families 
with incomes from 200 to 299 percent 
of the FPL, the 90th percentile burden 
would be reduced from the AHFA’s 
19.3 to 14.6 percent of income under 
the H.R. 3962 subsidies. The reduction 
in the burden would be smaller for 
those with incomes from 300 to 399 
percent of the FPL. The 90th percentile 
burden for this income group would 
still be 18.8 percent of income with 
the larger subsidies. Ten percent of 
families with incomes from 400 to 499 
percent of the FPL would have burdens 
of about 19 percent under all options. 
For the highest income group, the 90th 
percentile burden is close to 15 percent 
in all cases.21 
America’s Healthy Future 
Act (AHFA) 
AHFA with Premium 
Subsidies and  
Cost-Sharing Subsidies 
from PPACA
AHFA with Premium 
Subsidies and Cost-
Sharing Subsidies from 
H.R. 3962
Out-of-pocket Health Insurance Premiums as a Share of Income
90th Percentile
133–199% FPL 6.9% 6.2% 5.4%
200–299% FPL 11.2% 9.4% 9.6%
300–399% FPL 12.0% 9.9% 11.4%
400–499% FPL 13.4% 13.4% 13.4%
500% FPL or more 10.9% 10.8% 10.9%
Out-of-pocket Cost-sharing for Health Care as a Share of Income
90th Percentile
133–199% FPL 6.8% 6.6% 2.5%
200–299% FPL 9.8% 9.8% 5.6%
300–399% FPL 8.5% 8.6% 8.3%
400–499% FPL 7.0% 7.1% 7.1%
500% FPL or more 5.5% 5.5% 5.5%
Total Health Care Costs as a Share of Income
90th Percentile
133–199% FPL 14.0% 13.4% 7.6%
200–299% FPL 19.3% 18.1% 14.6%
300–399% FPL 19.6% 18.3% 18.8%
400–499% FPL 18.8% 18.9% 19.4%
500% FPL or more 15.0% 15.0% 14.9%
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2009.       
  
Notes: Total family health care costs include premiums plus out-of-pocket health care spending, less subsidies. “Family” refers to 
health insurance units, that is, family members who buy insurance coverage as a group, including single individuals. Reforms are 
modeled as if they were fully implemented in 2009, and estimates are for that single year.
Table 7.  90th Percentile Financial Burdens of Family Health Care Costs  
for Enrollees in the Nongroup Exchange, by Income as a  
Percent of the FPL 
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Reducing the highest burdens by 
expanding cost-sharing subsidies. 
Given the relatively high burdens 
that remain at the 90th percentile for 
those between 200 and 400 percent 
of the FPL even with higher subsidies, 
we analyze the effects of a targeted 
increase in the cost-sharing subsidies 
beyond those specified in H.R. 3962 
(the “enhanced cost-sharing subsidies” 
shown in column 4 of Table 2) in 
conjunction with H.R. 3962 premium 
subsidies. Table 8 shows the effects of 
the enhanced cost-sharing subsidies, 
which raise the actuarial value of 
subsidized plans for those between 
250 and 350 percent of the FPL to 85 
percent. The number of uninsured 
would decline by an additional 300,000 
people relative to the case using H.R. 
3962 subsidies. Nongroup exchange 
coverage would increase from 20.3 
million to 21.4 million people, as more 
people are attracted to the higher levels 
of cost-sharing assistance. 
The enhanced cost-sharing subsidies 
would reduce the 90th percentile 
financial burden for those with incomes 
from 300 to 399 percent of the FPL 
from 18.8 to 16.5 percent. There would 
be some slight reductions in financial 
burdens for other income groups as 
well. In terms of dollars, costs at the 
90th percentile of spending for those 
with incomes between 200 and 299 
percent of the FPL would fall from 
$6,048 under the H.R. 3962 subsidies to 
$5,708 with the enhanced cost-sharing 
subsidies, a $340 reduction (not shown 
in the table). The dollar decrease is 
nearly twice as large for those with 
incomes between 300 and 399 percent 
of the FPL, whose costs at the 90th 
percentile of spending would fall 
$623, from $9,778 under the H.R. 3962 
subsidies to $9,154 with the enhanced 
cost-sharing subsidies (not shown in 
table). The decline in financial burdens 
and increase in coverage is achieved at 
the cost of $2.5 billion in additional cost-
sharing subsidies. Premium subsidies 
increase by an additional $1.7 billion 
due to the increase in the number of 
people obtaining coverage through the 
exchange. 
Neither the cost-sharing subsidies 
in H.R. 3962 nor the enhanced cost-
sharing subsidies modeled above apply 
to families with incomes above 400 
percent of the FPL. However, those 
with income immediately above the 
level of subsidies (400 to 499 percent of 
the FPL) also face high burdens at the 
90th percentile. Many of those at higher 
income levels with particularly high 
burdens are older persons who have 
a combination of high medical needs 
and high premiums due to the 4:1 age 
rating in AHFA. A reduction in age rating 
to 2:1, as in H.R. 3962, could reduce 
the health care burdens of this group 
significantly.22 
Discussion
The levels of premium and cost-sharing 
subsidies have important implications 
for coverage, costs, and the affordability 
of health care under reform. Larger 
subsidies draw more people into the 
exchange and reduce the number 
of people who remain uninsured. 
Compared with the subsidies under 
AHFA, the modified premium subsidies 
under PPACA are somewhat higher for 
low-income families and somewhat 
lower for high-income families in 
the subsidy-eligible income range. In 
contrast, the H.R. 3962 subsidies are 
larger than those under AHFA at every 
applicable income level. Comparing 
AHFA with Premium 
Subsidies and Cost-
Sharing Subsidies from 
H.R. 3962
AHFA with Premium 
Subsidies from H.R. 3962 
and “Enhanced” Cost-
Sharing Subsidies
Difference
Number of Uninsured  
(in Millions)
17.3 17.0 -0.3
Nongroup  
Exchange Coverage
20.3 21.4 1.1
Total Government Spending (in Billions)
Premium Subsidies $31.9 $33.6 $  1.7
Cost-Sharing Subsidies $  7.0 $  9.5 $  2.5
Total Health Care Costs as a Share of Income
Median
133–199% FPL 4.8% 4.8% 0.0%
200–299% FPL 9.1% 9.1% 0.0%
300–399% FPL 11.6% 11.3% -0.3%
400–499% FPL 10.2% 10.1% -0.1%
500% FPL or more 7.7% 7.7% 0.0%
90th Percentile
133–199% FPL 7.6% 7.5% -0.1%
200–299% FPL 14.6% 13.8% -0.8%
300–399% FPL 18.8% 16.5% -2.3%
400–499% FPL 19.4% 18.8% -0.6%
500% FPL or more 14.9% 14.9% 0.0%
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2009.       
  
Notes: Total family health care costs include premiums plus out-of-pocket health care spending, less subsidies. “Family” refers to 
health insurance units, that is, family members who buy insurance coverage as a group, including single individuals. Reforms are 
modeled as if they were fully implemented in 2009, and estimates are for that single year.
Table 8.  Effects of a Targeted Increase in Cost-Sharing Subsidies Above 
Those in H.R. 3962
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overall coverage under the PPACA 
subsidies, we estimate there would 
be nearly half a million more people 
with coverage under reform relative to 
AHFA. With H.R. 3962 subsidies, we 
estimate there would be 2 million more 
people with coverage under reform 
than under AHFA. 
Government spending would of course 
be higher with larger subsidies than 
those in AHFA. Lower uncompensated 
care costs would offset some of this 
higher spending. The main benefit from 
the higher spending is that more people 
would gain coverage, and those who 
have coverage would find their health 
care costs less financially burdensome; 
this is particularly true for low-income 
families. Those in the nongroup market 
are most affected by the premium and 
cost-sharing subsidies under reform, 
since those who are Medicaid or CHIP 
eligible would be provided with full 
coverage at little or no cost to the family 
and workers with employer offers would 
typically be ineligible for subsidies. 
Beyond premium costs, covered families 
are at risk for high out-of-pocket 
cost burdens when a family member 
becomes seriously ill. The higher cost-
sharing subsidies in H.R. 3962, relative 
to the AHFA, and the “enhanced” cost-
sharing schedule would substantially 
reduce the financial burden of out-of-
pocket costs for those in the upper tail 
of health care spending.
While any standard of what constitutes 
an affordable financial burden is 
subjective and an inherently political 
decision, it is important to consider 
not only the impacts on the typical 
family, but also families in the upper 
tail of the distribution of burdens. An 
alternative option for reducing the 
burdens for those with the highest 
health care spending in the exchange 
is to increase the actuarial value of the 
standard package. This approach would 
spread costs associated with the higher-
cost enrollees more broadly through 
increases in premiums rather than 
leaving users of care to pay these costs. 
Another option for reducing the highest 
health care burdens in the exchange 
would be to switch to 2:1 age rating, as 
in H.R. 3962, which would significantly 
reduce the highest premiums for older 
people relative to those under the 4:1 
age rating in AHFA. 
These strategies would not, however, 
address a remaining affordability 
issue beyond the scope of this paper. 
Low-income workers employed by 
large firms that offer coverage to their 
workers would not have access to the 
same financial assistance in purchasing 
coverage as similar employees without 
employer offers. This is a potentially 
significant issue in AHFA, PPACA, and 
H.R. 3962.
Despite potentially high burdens for 
some, the AHFA and other reform 
options presented here would bring 
about several major improvements in 
the health system. They would stem the 
continuous erosion in the number of 
Americans with health care coverage by 
increasing affordability and access for 
millions of people, decrease financial 
pressures on the hospitals and clinics 
that provide care to the uninsured, 
and reduce many system inefficiencies. 
Thus, legislation that improves both 
the health and the financial security 
of the American people may be within 
reach. In continuing negotiations 
over the details of health care reform 
legislation, policymakers must weigh 
the implications of high health care 
financing burdens for families against 
the additional budgetary costs of larger 
premium and cost-sharing subsidies. 
Public support for the reforms will 
be related to the extent to which 
coverage and the direct costs of care 
are considered affordable. Affordability, 
in turn, will affect compliance with 
the individual mandate. Without broad 
compliance, it will be very hard to 
maintain the proposed insurance 
reforms, which depend greatly on 
broad risk pools.
Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues 13
Notes
1 Baucus, Max. America’s Healthy Future Act of 
2009, Chairman’s Mark, Senate Finance Com-
mittee. Modified October 2, 2009. http://www.
finance.senate.gov/sitepages/leg/LEG%20
2009/100209_Americas_Healthy_Future_Act_
AMENDED.pdf. Affordable Health Care for America 
Act (H.R. 3962) introduced October 29, 2009. 
http://docs.house.gov/rules/health/111_ahcaa.
pdf. Reid, Harry. The Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act, introduced as a “substitute” amend-
ment of H.R. 3590 on November 18, 2009. http://
democrats.senate.gov/reform/patient-protection-
affordable-care-act.pdf.
2   The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) also 
considered the affordability of health care costs in 
a new health insurance exchange under AHFA in a 
letter released October 9, 2009 (http://www.cbo.
gov/ftpdocs/106xx/doc10692/SFC_Subsidies_Pen-
alties_10-09.pdf). They report financial burdens 
based on average premiums and cost sharing in 
the exchange, whereas we report median financial 
burdens as well as burdens in the upper tail of the 
distribution (90th percentile). Our mean burdens 
(not shown) are somewhat lower than what 
CBO reports. The main reason for the difference 
is that CBO reports burdens for 2016 and those 
we report are for 2009. Due to health care costs 
growing faster than incomes over time, burdens in 
later years should be higher. 
3   To facilitate the comparison of different subsidy 
schedules, comprehensive reforms specified 
under H.R. 3962 that differ from AHFA, such as the 
expansion of Medicaid to 150 percent of the FPL, 
are not modeled here.
4   A description of the construction of the model 
can be found in Bowen Garrett, John Holahan, 
Allison Cook, Irene Headen, and Aaron Lucas. 
“The Coverage and Cost Impacts of Expanding 
Medicaid.” Washington DC: The Kaiser Commission 
on Medicaid and the Uninsured. May 2009. http://
www.kff.org/medicaid/upload7901.pdf.
5   HIPSM uses data from several national data 
sets: the March Current Population Survey (CPS) 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement, the 
February CPS Contingent Work and Alternative 
Employment Supplement, the Medical Expendi-
ture Panel Survey (MEPS), the Statistics of Income 
(SOI) Public Use Tax File, and the Statistics of 
US Business. Distributions of coverage are based 
on March CPS data with adjustments for the 
Medicaid undercount. Behavioral modules in 
HIPSM represent individual and family demand for 
health insurance coverage through a utility-based 
approach in which each individual is assigned a 
utility value that measures the relative desirability 
of each health insurance option. These utilities 
then shape decisions when reform options are in-
troduced. The responsiveness of health insurance 
decisions to changes in health insurance options 
and premiums are calibrated in HIPSM to findings 
in the empirical economics literature.
6   To say that higher actuarial value plans provide 
more comprehensive coverage is true on average 
across the insured population. It is important to 
note, however, that many different plan structures 
can achieve the same actuarial value. Depending 
on how plan structure interacts with the charac-
teristics of a particular insured person (e.g., their 
health conditions and types of medical spending), 
it is possible to have a plan of higher actuarial 
value that requires more out-of-pocket spending 
than a plan with lower actuarial value. See for 
example the testimony of Karen Pollitz before the 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 25 
June 2009. http://energycommerce.house.gov/
Press_111/20090625/testimony_pollitz.pdf.
7   For an analysis of the effects of different age 
rating bands, see Blumberg, Buettgens, and Garrett, 
“Age Rating under Comprehensive Health Care 
Reform,” Washington DC: The Urban Institute. 
October 2009, http://www.urban.org/url.
cfm?ID=411970 
8   Adults with incomes between 100 and 133 
percent of the FPL have the option of choosing 
subsidized exchange coverage or Medicaid.
9   For each employee who enrolls in subsidized 
coverage through the nongroup exchange, the 
free-rider penalty is equal to the national average 
premium subsidy. The total penalty for the firm 
is capped at $400 times the total number of em-
ployees in the firm. While the proposed legislation 
would apply free-rider penalties only for full-time 
employees, we simulate this provision as if it ap-
plied to all employees. This simplification does not 
substantively impact the results.
10   Employers are required to enroll employees in a 
firm-sponsored health insurance plan unless the 
employee explicitly opts out of coverage. This 
applies to employees who do not have other cov-
erage and who work in large firms that sponsor a 
health plan. The proposed legislation applies this 
provision to firms with 200 or more employees. 
Since the firm size data from the CPS are reported 
in ranges, e.g., 100 to 500 employees, we simulate 
this provision as if it applies to firms with 100 or 
more employees. Since this affects relatively few 
employees, and they are generally not eligible for 
subsidies in the nongroup exchange, this simpli-
fication does not substantively impact the results 
as presented.
11   If states scale back Medicaid or CHIP eligibility, 
overall coverage under any of the reforms mod-
eled here could be substantially lower.
12   We do not model temporary provisions such as 
the reinsurance program and make several other 
simplifications as well. We do not model the rating 
rules specified in AHFA related to smoking or 
wellness; consequently, the results understate the 
financial burdens at the upper end of the distribu-
tion in the exchange. We do not model separate 
state exchanges, the possibility of separate small 
group and nongroup exchanges in some states, 
excise taxes on high premium plans, the young 
invincible exchange plan, and the 65 percent 
actuarial value exchange plan. Nor do we model 
cooperatives. We do not model the ESI exchange 
to include firms with more than 100 employees, 
although states may choose to allow larger firms 
to participate starting in 2017. The model does 
not distinguish documented and undocumented 
individuals. Unlike other reform proposals, the 
AHFA does not include a public plan and so one is 
not modeled here.
13   This shift in indexing could lead to increased 
adverse selection in the exchange over time.
14   Under PPACA, health plans that satisfy the cover-
age requirement (other than small-group plans) 
must have spending limits for annual cost-sharing 
not greater than those that apply to HSA-qualified 
high-deductible health plans. In 2009, these 
limits are set at $5,800/individual and $11,600/
family. Under PPACA, out-of-pocket spending 
in an exchange plan is limited to the following: 
one-third of the HSA limit ($1,933/individual and 
$3,867/family in 2009) for those with incomes 
from 100 to 200 percent of the FPL; one-half of 
the HSA limit ($2,900/individual and $5,800/
family in 2009) for those with incomes from 200 
to 300 percent of the FPL; and two-thirds of the 
HSA limit ($3,867/individual and $7,733/family 
in 2009) for those with incomes from 300 to 400 
percent of the FPL. Under H.R. 3962, all health 
plans that satisfy the coverage requirement must 
have spending limits for annual cost-sharing of 
$5,000/individual and $10,000/family. Under H.R. 
3962, out-of-pocket spending in the exchange 
is limited to the following: $500/individual and 
$1,000/family for those with incomes from 133 
to 150 percent of the FPL; $1,000/individual and 
$2,000/family for those with incomes from 150 
to 200 percent of the FPL; $2,000/individual and 
$4,000/family for those with incomes from 200 
to 250 percent of the FPL; $4,000/individual and 
$8,000/family for those with incomes from 250 
to 300 percent of the FPL; $4,500/individual and 
$9,000/family for those with incomes from 300 to 
350 percent of the FPL; and $5,000/individual and 
$10,000/family for those with incomes from 350 
to 400 percent of the FPL.
15   Most of this additional spending is by those with 
incomes above 400 percent of the FPL (data not 
shown). Families with incomes below 133 per-
cent of the FPL spend considerably less under the 
AHFA compared to current law, mainly as a conse-
quence of expanded Medicaid eligibility for adults. 
Those with incomes from 133 to 399 percent 
of the FPL would spend somewhat more on net 
under the AHFA compared to today, largely due 
to the increase in the number of people formerly 
uninsured who would purchase insurance either 
through an employer or through the exchange.
16   Under the H.R. 3962 subsidies, all subsidy-eligible 
income groups would see a reduction in health 
care spending compared to AHFA; those with in-
comes from 133 to 199 percent of the FPL would 
also see a reduction in health care spending com-
pared to the baseline (data not shown).
17   A health insurance unit consists of the group of 
family members that can typically enroll in private 
health insurance together. This includes married 
adults, their dependent children up to age 18, and 
full-time students younger than age 24.
18   Since employers’ contributions account for 79 
percent of the full premium on average, few em-
ployees face premium contributions high enough 
to qualify for premium subsidies.
19   Even though families are exempted from the 
individual mandate when premiums are greater 
than 8 percent of income, many families would 
(and currently do) pay more than 8 percent to 
obtain coverage.
20   Zuvekas, Samuel H., and Joel W. Cohen (2007). 
“Prescription Drugs and the Changing Concentra-
tion of Health Care Expenditures.” Health Affairs. 
26(1): 249–57.
21   Small variations in burdens for the two highest 
income groups are due to differences in the com-
position of the exchange pool across the policy 
options.
22   See Blumberg et al. “Age Rating under Compre-
hensive Health Care Reform.”
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